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AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP:
COMBATING A GLOBAL THREAT
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE
FREEDOM-KAI PHILLIPS†
Climate change has traversed from the realm of environmental speculation to
political policy. No longer is it an issue of lacking scientific evidence; rather it
is now an issue of lacking political will. Courageously, the European Union,
after gauging the international landscape for a multilateral accord and
finding it wanting, has forged forward unilaterally to combat this pressing
and substantial threat. In enacting the 20/20 by 2020 the EU has not only set
a profound precedent for other developed nations, but has also placed a great
burden on its domestic industries. This article examines the EU’s regulatory
response, in light of its WTO obligations. On the whole, it argues that the
EU is well within its sovereign right to apply this measure domestically.
Furthermore, it demonstrates that the EU also has strong legal arguments
to justify influencing other developed nations to abide by a similar regime
through an interpretation of past WTO jurisprudence. Finally, it makes
recommendations to empower nations to be more effective at combating
threats of this magnitude. On the whole, nations must be supported in
progressive environmental actions, rather than hindered.

Freedom-Kai Phillip graduated in May 2009 with an LL.B. from Dalhousie University.
He holds a Master of Arts in diplomacy and international relations from the John C.
Whitehead School at Seton Hall University and a Bachelor of Science (magna cum
laude) from Eastern Michigan University. His research has focused principally on public
international law, international trade law and international environmental law.
†
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I. INTRODUCTION

The global climate crisis has recently moved to the forefront of political
discourse. However, it has proven difficult to find a consensus on how to
proceed at the international level, and few nations have made concrete
attempts domestically to mitigate the continued damage caused to the
environment by human activity. In light of such disagreement and apathy
on the international stage, the European Union (EU) has forged forward
with a domestic legislative initiative which amounts to a quantum leap in
environmentally based climate change reforms. They have singlehandedly
taken it upon themselves to act as the vanguard of the global climate
revolution, although this progressive step forward comes at an immense
cost to both domestic industries and the average citizen. This increased
burden has invigorated a heated debate on why EU citizens should pay the
price for environmental preservation while others continue to be lethargic
on the subject. More prudently, Mr. Jose Manuel Barroso, the current
President of the European Commission, has threatened to impose a carbon
tariff on all imports into the EU to offset the lack of an international
agreement on the subject, and to level the playing field for EC industries.1
This paper will examine if such a measure would be legally permissible
under the EU’s treaty obligations pursuant to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) covered agreements. To set a solid groundwork, it
will first briefly outline both the threat posed by climate change, and the
EU’s comprehensive response. Second, it will offer a detailed analysis of the
EU’s measures in relation to their legal obligations under the WTO and the
subsequent limitations placed on the EU to respond to the threat of climate
change. Finally, it will propose some reforms to the WTO system which
will empower nations with the requisite flexibility to address the climate
crisis, while allowing them to continue to be WTO compliant. Ultimately,
climate change is a threat to all humankind. In lieu of an internationally
negotiated response, nations should be emboldened rather than restricted
1 Roger Harrabin, “Barroso trade threat on climate,” BBC News (22 January 2008),
online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7201835.stm>
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in their reaction to such a pressing and substantial threat. For it is
only through the daring actions of the valiant that others may become
motivated to act as well.

II. THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
EUROPEAN RESPONSE

It is imperative to be able to make an informed assessment of the validity
of a legislative response to the threat of climate change as well as to have
have an understanding of both the threat itself and the possible outcomes
of non-action. Thus, this section will begin by outlining what the current
scientific consensus is on our world’s climate, and its implications to the
global citizenry. Secondly, it will offer an explanation of the particular
climate regime recently agreed to by the European Commission. On the
whole, the threat posed by our ever deteriorating environment is quite
pressing, and the response put in place by the EU is not only a progressive
change in approach, but a welcomed acceptance of responsibility by
Western industrialized nations.

A. The Current State of the Earth’s Climate
To have a proper term of reference, climate change is referred to by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is a
representative body made up of the world’s foremost experts, as “a
change in the state of the climate that can be identified… whether due
to natural variability or as a result of human activity.”2 This usage has a
subtle difference from the operating definition used by the United Nations
2 IPCC, “Synthesis Report” Climate Change 2007 Forth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Allali, A. et al. eds. (Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 30, online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf>
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which focuses
on “a change that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere.”3 It is important at the
onset to focus on this nuance for a moment. Although both the IPCC and
the UNFCCC concentrate on climate change and each uniquely craft their
respective terms of reference to focus on the effect, the IPCC also notes the
natural variability of the earth’s climate. This is a significant clarification
because without question, there is a naturally occurring fluctuation in
the climatic environment which has been measured over time. However,
never in the history of mankind has this naturally occurring phenomenon
occurred so rapidly or been so readily observable.
It is now unequivocal that we are experiencing a rapid shift in the global
climate due principally to increased concentrations of Green House Gases
(GHG) such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.4 The rapid rise in
abundance of these gases individually is also remarkably telling. Global levels
of carbon dioxide (CO2), measured from ice core tests, have risen from the preindustrial level of 280 parts per million (PPM) to 379 ppm in 2005.5 Secondly,
the atmospheric concentration of methane (CH4) has increased from a preindustrial level of 715 parts per billion (ppb) to 1774 ppb in 2005.6 Finally,
nitrous oxide (N2O) concentrations have increased from a pre-industrial level
of 270 ppb to 319 ppb in 2005.7 Furthermore, this rise in CO2 and CH4 levels
is directly attributable to the increased use of fossil fuels, while over a third of
N2O is attributable to massive agricultural growth.8 Although each of these
statistics is focusing on relatively small increments (parts per million/parts per
billion), taken cumulatively, they illustrate that GHG emissions that stem from
human activity, increased by 70% in the time frame between 1970 and 2004.9
3 Ibid.
4 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers” Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, S. Solomon et al. eds. (Cambridge
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 2, online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf>
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. at 3.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Allali, supra note 2 at 36.
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More worrisome, these affects have become readily observable not only
by scientists but by citizens around the globe. Firstly, between the years
1995 to 2006 all but one year ranks among the warmest years in recorded
history – a record that dates back to 1850.10 Secondly, because this
temperature increase is intensified at more northern latitudes, there has
been a profound increase in glacial lakes, instability in permafrost regions,
and alteration of Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems.11 Finally, environmental
strain has become acute in many regions globally, with an observable
reduction in the length of growth seasons, a rise in sea level,12 and an
increase in both the frequency and activity of tropical storm behaviour.13
On the whole, the current state of the global climate is very tragic and
demands a rapid response. What is at stake is no longer simply an
economic, social or political issue; but as noted by the renowned economist
and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, it has traversed into an issue of moral
importance and more glaringly social justice.14 However, considering the
immense difficulty multilateral negotiators had at the United Nations
Climate Convention 2007 in Bali to simply set a timetable for upcoming
negotiations – though in the 11th hour the United States eventually gave
ground allowing for an agreement – it is no wonder concerned states
simply accept the responsibility to set the timetable for themselves. Clearly,
climate change is not a threat to be neglected. As Dr. D. K. Pachauri,
Chairman of the IPCC said in Oslo, as he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize on behalf of the IPCC, “neglect in protecting our heritage of natural
resources could prove extremely harmful for the human race and for all
species that share common space on planet earth.”15
10 Allali, supra note 2 at 30.
11 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers” Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Parry, M.L. et al. eds. (Cambridge
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 8, online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf>
12 Ibid. at 9.
13 Allali, supra note 2 at 30.
14 Joseph Stiglitz, “The Changing Climate on Climate Change” Project Syndicate online:
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz80>
15 R.K. Pachauri, “Acceptance Speech for the Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” Address 10 December 2007 [unpublished],
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B. The European Union 20/20 By 2020
Following the 2007 report of the IPCC which concluded that the global
average temperature could be expected to increase by an additional 1.8°
to 4°C this century, the EU made a firm commitment to not allow this to
occur.16 Europe was already a world leader in combating climate change
in many respects. Beginning in 2002 with the voluntary UK Emissions
Trading Scheme (UK ETS) and later expanding into the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in January 2005, the EU created a market
based approach to addressing climate change. Under the EU cap-andtrade scheme, companies were granted carbon emission allowances;
subsequently industries worked to reduce their emissions below the capped
amount. Those industries that were able to achieve this reduction were
then able to sell their extra allowance to industries that were unable – for
whatever reason – to meet their targets.17 There were also penalties for not
being able to achieve the allotted target, which currently sits at €40 per
tonne, but this rate increased to €100 per tonne in 2008.
This market based approach was both an innovative response, and a cost
effective approach, to achieving the EU’s Kyoto targets. The European
Commission has noted the EU ETS had a total annual cost of between
€2.9 to €3.7 billion (bn), compared to an estimated €6.8 billion total cost to
achieve the same targets without the EU ETS.18 However, there were two
fundamental shortcomings to the EU ETS. First, it was sector specific, in
that it focused only on energy intensive industries.19 Second, the market
was voluntary in nature.20 However, the EU ETS did prove that a voluntary
online: <http://www.ipcc.ch/graphics/speeches/nobel-peace-prize-oslo-10-december2007.pdf>
16 EC, EU Action against Climate Change: Leading Global Action to 2020 and Beyond
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007) at 4,
online: EC <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/bali/post_2012.pdf>
17 Ron Dembo & Clive Davidson, Everything You Wanted to Know About Offsetting But
Were Afraid to Ask (Canada: Zerofootprint Publications, 2007) at 67.
18 Ibid. at 68.
19 Ibid. at 67; focus was on oil refineries, iron and steel plants, and manufacturers of
cement, glass and paper amounting to approximately 13,000 installations and accounting
for about one half of the EU’s total CO2 emissions.
20 Ricardo Bayon, Amanda Hawn & Katherine Hamilton, Voluntary Carbon Markets: an
International Business Guide to What They Are and How They Work (London: Earthscan,
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compliance system was viable, laying the groundwork for an efficient
trading scheme, and encouraged a relative level of forward thinking
regarding carbon management which was non-existent prior.21
Building on the success of the EU ETS, in the early days of 2008, the EU
passed a Directive amending the original ETS system (created under
Directive 2003/87/EC) and implemented a mandatory community-wide
commitment to achieve two broad-based goals. First, the EU committed
to reducing all GHG emissions by at least 20% below 1990 levels, with
that percentage increasing to 30% contingent upon comparable emission
commitments by other developed nations.22 Second, and simultaneously,
the EU also committed to using 20% renewable energies by 2020.23 Thus,
the proposal received the endearing name of the 20/20 by 2020. However,
a proposal such as this is both extremely complex to initiate and has
immense costs to implement and maintain. It is suggested that the program
could have a direct cost of, on the low end (with oil costing between $55-62
USD per barrel) €91bn by 2020 accounting for 0.58% of EU GDP, or on
the high end (with oil costing $100 USD per barrel) €275bn.24 Principally,
the EU is going to focus on enhancing the EU ETS to capitalize on its
past accomplishment while looking to harmonize the system across the
community to broaden its application to get maximum results. Further,
EU companies will also have the option to use Clean Development
Mechanisms (CDM), a system which allows for foreign investment in
emission-saving projects, particularly in developing countries, to earn
carbon credits which can then be used domestically.25
2007) at 80.
21 Ibid.
22 EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading system of the Community,[2008] O.J. 2008/0013 (COD), at 13. This proposed
Directive was recently adopted by the EC and is available in its updated form online at:
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st03/st03737.en08.pdf>.
23 Ibid. at 15.
24 EC, “Impact Assessment” Document accompanying the Package of Implementation
Measures for the EU’s Objectives on Climate Change and Renewable Energy for 2020,
[2008] O.J. 85/3 at 7, online: EC <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/climate_actions/doc/2008_
res_ia_en.pdf>
25 EC, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
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It is important to note that the EU makes explicit references to achieving
these progressive goals in accordance with WTO obligations.26
Paradoxically, it seems almost impossible to demand a high level of
environmental protection – at an immense cost – and to protect industries
from a competitive disadvantage, all the while staying WTO compliant.
However, the EU has put forward three curious strategies of particular
interest to this quandary. First, they propose Global Sectoral Agreements
(GSA) which would allow for industry leaders to come to an accord to
reduce GHG emissions across sectors and without requiring recourse to
the multilateral arena.27 Second, the EU could allot ETS allowances free of
charge to energy intensive industries to offset or compensate for the direct
and indirect costs of adaptation to the new program.28 Finally, the EU put
forward the notion of including importers of energy intensive products
into the EU ETS system, thus forcing them to purchase the same ETS
credits as EU industries.29 All three have promise and could be utilized to
assist in the difficult transition ahead. However, each carries with them
particular elements of concerns in the context of the WTO.
On the whole, although quite lofty the 20/20 by 2020 actually seems rather
plausible. It sets out various options for implementation dependent upon
the level of development of the member state, has flexibility in approach
incorporated into the overall framework and is aimed at minimizing
market detriment by embracing the most cost effective strategy available.
Furthermore, it now has the broad support of the European Communities
as a whole, and is expected to be formally enacted by the spring of 2009.30
The question, however, remains: are the measures proposed formally
compatible with the WTO covered agreements?
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,” 20 20
by 2020: Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity [2008] O.J. 30 (COM) at 6, online: <http://
ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/COM2008_030_en.pdf>
26 Ibid. at 17.
27 “Impact Assessment” supra note 24 at 18.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Nick Childs, “EU agrees climate plan deadline,” BBC News (14 March 2008), online:
BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7296564.stm>
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III. WTO OBLIGATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
OF STATE ACTION

Climate change is a real and viable threat, and the EU has stepped forward
with an innovative plan to combat arguably the single greatest peril facing
humankind. They have proposed a comprehensive strategy which is
aimed at achieving their articulated goals, while maintaining commercial
competitiveness. However, an inherent concern at the onset is, would the
proposed framework be in violation of the EU’s treaty obligations under
WTO law? This section will first put forward the three EU measures
aimed at harmonizing both market efficacy and the overall climate change
initiative while defining how they fit into the EU initiative on the whole.
Second, it will scrutinize if these measures in fact are acceptable under the
WTO through an analysis of the appropriate jurisprudence. Holistically,
the EU must be tremendously tactful in how it implements its 20/20
by 2020 measures. For if they are not drafted carefully, the EU may be
in violation of the covered agreements, and even if they are acceptable
under the WTO legal regime, the measures may not be politically sound
considering the international effects.

A. Measures Aimed At Harmonizing The Market
and The Environment
There are three primary measures referenced by the EU to help strike a
balance between market competitiveness and the obvious restrictiveness
of the proposed climate change initiative. Each measure has both merits
and demerits, but each on the whole is a worthwhile attempt to combat
such a complex and inherently global problem. First, a GSA would aim
to curb GHG discharge through a deal by pollution heavy segments of
the international economy to collectively reduce emissions. If a GSA were
struck between major industrialized sectors and realistic efforts were put
forth equally, this approach could amount to a large scale reduction of
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GHG in the atmosphere in a very short period of time.31 Another positive
aspect of a GSA approach is that the cost of implementation and adaption
would be dispersed over several large economies rather than simply
concentrated in one. Lastly, by virtue of it being a mutually beneficial
agreement between the parties and with the costs being delineated
outward, the competitiveness of the industries on the whole would be
maintained. Albeit a minor increase in product value to offset some of the
initial costs of adaptation, when compared to a government mandated
program, this cost would be relatively low because of its voluntary nature.
However, the largest and most damaging drawback of a GSA approach is
that it is too idealistic. Industries may, out of self interest, consider signing
on to an agreement of this sort but most likely they will not unless they
must. A multilateral agreement would need to be constructed, in turn
challenging industries to evolve.
Second, if the EU were to allocate ETS allowances to energy intensive
sectors free of charge, at first glance, it would seemingly undermine the
ETS system as a whole because of the number of industries that would
claim the “energy intensive” classification. However, if clear benchmarks
were established for the type of industry, energy efficiency levels, requisite
emission reduction, and percentage of investment in new technologies
and research and development (R&D), theoretically, free allocations could
maximize the effective use of economic resources from the corporate
perspective, while insuring only a marginal increase in product costs to the
public. Moreover, free allocations could also be valuable in that they could
act as a means of compensation to offset the increased cost of energy,32
thus preserving a moderate level of competitiveness and reducing the
subsequent costs to consumers.
Lastly, if importers were included into the ETS market and forced – just
like domestic produces – to purchase allowances to offset their products,
such an approach could have some very interesting results. First, by having
ETS credits as a precursor to being granted access to the EU market,
31 Supra note 24 at 18.
32 Ibid.
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it would require importing industries to reconsider their approach to
the topic of GHG emissions. Second, such a strategy could also work to
decrease global emissions by putting a price-tag on a failure to comply.
Finally, if importers were to purchase ETS credits it would have favourable
impacts on domestic producers as it would be a levelling mechanism
to concerns of competitiveness. However, there are two major worries.
Initially, having wide spread demand for ETS credits would not only
increase the value of them on the market, but would also put an increased
pressure on the domestic ETS system as a whole.33 Secondly, demanding
that all importers have the requisite ETS allowance could have some very
negative political consequences. On the whole, each measure individually
has validity, but no one strategy on its own would seem overly persuasive.

B. Climate Change Measures and WTO Jurisprudence
Each of the aforementioned mechanisms looks to be beneficial in terms
of balancing competitiveness and effectiveness. However, a preliminary
question of key importance is whether each measure individually, or in
concert with another, is compatible with the EU’s obligations under the
covered agreements. The EU has repeatedly stressed the importance of
maintaining its WTO obligations. Thus, this section will first consider the
permissibility of each strategy individually under WTO law. Second, it
will consider the legal ramifications of unifying two of the measures – free
ETS allocations and importer inclusion – to see if a hybrid measure is still
permissible.
1. Global Sectoral Agreement (GSA)
Although there are three measures enumerated, focus will be spent on
the two most contentious. The rationale for this stems from the initial
assessment of the Global Sectoral Agreement (GSA). Logically, unless
there is some detrimental effect or ulterior purpose behind the agreement
which would draw particular attention to it, obviously sectors are not
33 Ibid.
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forbidden under either domestic or international legal regimes to conclude
an emission reduction accord. However, although it would be acceptable,
a multilaterally negotiated agreement would still surely be preferred as it
is concluded on intergovernmental rather than intersectoral grounds, and
would be multisectoral in nature rather than unisectoral.
2. ETS Allowances to Energy Intensive Industries
More debatable, if the EU were to offer free ETS allowances to energy
intensive industries, it prima facie raises concerns as to whether that
measure would amount to a subsidy. A subsidy has been loosely defined
for working purposes as “a form of benefit provided by government
to a private party, such as an industry group, a particular company or
an individual.”34 Although a more specific definition is found in the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM),35 if we
utilize the previous definition as a term of reference, it seems plausible
that the allotment of free ETS credits would be deemed a subsidy. More
concisely, the measure seems to be an actionable subsidy because it is
limited to particular sectors or industries, in this case, classified as energy
intensive. 36 However, two interesting questions must be addressed. First,
considering that the allocation is occurring within the confines of a rigid
environmental program, and while keeping in mind that some subsidies
could be correctional in nature, the question of benefit arises. If no real
benefit is being conferred, in that the allowance is in place to alleviate a
gross market distortion from relaxed environmental standards, a panel
may – when considering if it causes injury, nullification or impairment,
or serious prejudice – find that the allowance was not a subsidy. Second,
34 Andrew Green, “Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies” (2006) 5:3 World Trade
Review 377 at 380.
35 WTO`s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures defines “subsidy” as:
(a)(1) financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory
of a Member or (a)(2) any form of income or price support and (b) a benefit is thereby
conferred; WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 15 Apr. 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA Legal
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, at Article 1.1, online: WTO <http://www.
wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf>
36 Michael Trebilcock & Michael Fishbein, “International Trade: Barriers to Trade” in
Andrew Guzman & Alan Sykes, eds., Research Handbook in International Economic Law
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007) at 22.
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the Appellate Body suggested in US – Foreign Sales Corporations, that
in the absence of a uniform world tax system states were free to exercise
their discretion in taxation.37 In an analogous situation, would it not be
permissible, in the absence of a uniform ETS system, to exercise similar
discretion? Realistically, although there are arguments to the contrary
which may be persuasive, it seems plausible that a panel would err on
the side of sovereignty and allow the EU to allocate ETS allowances to
particular industries barring there is no benefit.
3. Importers Incorporated into the ETS System
The most politically contentious and difficult to administer of the proposed
measures, is if importers were to be required to purchase ETS credits as
a prerequisite to gaining access to the European common market, such a
measure would carry with it initially an air of insolence. Fundamentally,
the principles of Most Favoured Nation (MFN)38 and national treatment39
are the pillars of the international trading system. MFN is focused on
preferential treatment being afforded by one Member to another, and
obliges the party to afford that same privilege to all Members, while
national treatment is concerned with favouring domestic production over
the foreign production, and requires treatment of international products to
be “no less favourable” than its domestic counterpart.40 Furthermore, these
articles turn on whether the foreign and domestic products are considered
to be sufficiently “like.” For argument’s sake, likeness will be conceded
at this stage – although it will be revisited more thoroughly during the
consideration of the hybrid measure. However, if as suggested domestic
industries must not only purchase an annual ETS allowance, but must
also invest in greener technology, and pay an increased cost for energy
– by virtue of it being more environmentally sustainable – it is difficult
37 United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (Complaint by
European Communities) (2000) WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (Appellate Body Report),
online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm>;
Jagdish Bhagwati and Petros Mavroidis, “Is Action Against US Exports for Failure to Sign
the Kyoto Protocol WTO-Legal?” (2007) 6:2 World Trade Review 299 at 302.
38 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S.
1947 No. 27 (entered into force 1 January 1948) [GATT 1947]; see Article I.
39 Ibid, Article III.
40 Trebilcock & Fishbein, supra note 36 at 30.
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to see how in application such a requirement would be problematic. In
regards to imports, Article III: 4 of the GATT focuses on “treatment no
less favourable” than that afforded to domestic products, in terms of nontax regulations. Realistically, requiring importers to purchase the exact
same ETS credits for the same purpose – to offset carbon – as domestic
producers may not, therefore, be considered unacceptable by the panel.

C. Hybrid Measure – A Difficult Question
One of the difficulties with each of the aforementioned measures proposed
by the EU is that they are quite docile in application. They seem to only
superficially address the overall costs of the 20/20 by 2020 placed on
domestic producers, essentially leaving uncompetitive industries to sink
or swim. This was the exact concern French President Nicolas Sarkozy
had in mind when he called for importing nations to be “penalized” for
not capping their GHG emissions.41 A hybrid measure which requires
importers to purchase ETS credits if they have not achieved adequate
emission benchmarks, and which allocates a free allowance to domestic
producers who have, is seemingly more robust. Such a measure would
proactively encourage pollution intensive industries to evolve, if for no
other reason than to save on the annual cost under ETS mechanism.
However, the question remains, would such a measure be either
permissible or a justifiable exception under WTO law? The analysis
will first proceed through the MFN and national treatment stage, with
particular focus placed on likeness. Second, it will move to the exception
stage under Article XX of GATT. Finally it will consider the particularities
of the chapeau. In the end, if the hybrid measure has the requisite flexibility
it would stand a good chance of a panel finding it justified.

41 Jenny Barchfield, “France’s Sarkozy Calls for Carbon Tax” International Business Times
(15 January 2008) online: IBT <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080115/francessarkozy-calls-for-carbon-tax.htm>
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1. MFN and National Treatment – focusing on Likeness
As noted, the crux of the MFN and national treatment provisions of the
GATT turn on if the imported and the domestic products are considered
to be “like.” Although Article I of the GATT has been given historically a
broader interpretation then Article III for practical reasons, both sections
have been interpreted by panels using the findings of the Working Party on
Border Tax Adjustments. Using a case-by-case analysis, panels have applied
the Working Party’s criteria of: i) the properties, nature and quality of the
products, ii) the end-uses, iii) consumers’ tastes and habits, and iv) the
tariff classification in their assessment of likeness.42 In EC – Asbestos the
panel stressed the need to focus on each criterion individually, although
they are interrelated, and only once all relevant information has been
examined should a determination be found.43
Climate change has received an immense amount of interest in recent
years by politicians and consumers alike. People everywhere – particularly
in Europe – have become aware of the detrimental effects they are
having on the environment, and subsequently are beginning to change
their consumption habits. Although on the surface two products – one
being GHG friendly and one not – may seem to be “like” or “directly
competitive or substitutive,” because of identical properties, end-use, and
tariff classification the marketplace may still treat them as fundamentally
different for two important reasons. First, although chemically identical,
steel, for example, made under the EU ETS system will have an important
differentiating property; in its production its carbon emissions were
offset. Many products like “free-range” eggs, organic vegetables or dolphin
friendly tuna are differentiated because of some unique characteristic of
the product, arguably analogous to climate change initiatives. Second,
consumer tastes may demand to know how the product was produced.
With the increased attention on climate change and formal EU awareness
42 Susanne Dröge, et. al., “National Climate Change Policies and WTO Law: A Case
Study of Germany’s New Policies” (2004) 3:2 World Trade Review 161 at 165.
43 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos
(Complaint by Canada) (2001), WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R at para. 101-103 (Appellate
Body Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds135_e.htm> [EC—Asbestos].
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initiatives, the marketplace is beginning to slowly adapt to more
environmentally conscientious choices. Fundamentally, consumers may, as
was the case in EC—Asbestos, see the health risks associated with particular
products as unacceptable and thus treat them as two distinctly different
products. On the whole, as one commentator noted, “depending on the
level of consumer interest in addressing climate change on the one hand,
and the link between the PPM and environmental and human health
impacts of climate change on the other hand, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that a similar argument [to EC—Asbestos] could be made for
products that differ in their GHG emissions from production.”44
Finally, it is conceivable that a panel may look at a measure that has
essentially required importers to incur an increased cost unless they
demonstrated an adherence to particular benchmark scheme similarly
applied domestically as discriminatory. However, such an assessment
would focus entirely on the equality of the measure as it pertained to
domestic versus international products. In US—Reformulated Gas the
United States had a variable standard for domestic producers and an
inflexible standard for importers.45 This lack of consistency in application
was found to be a discriminatory trade measure. Similarly, if importers
were held to an equivalent set of emission benchmarks, or even a set
which was more flexible (as it would be practically difficult for the EU to
require technological or R&D investment) surely a panel would find such a
measure not to be in violation of national treatment.
2. Environmental Exceptions
Assuming however, that the products were considered sufficiently “like”
and that the measure was discriminatory in nature – even to a small
degree – the panel would next move to a consideration of the general
44 Meinhard Doelle, “Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate
State Action on Climate Change through the World Trade Organization,” (2004) 13:1
R.E.C.I.E.L. 85 at 94.
45 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Complaint by
Venezuela) (1996) WTO Doc. WT/DB2/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm> [US—Reformulated
Gas].
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exception clause found in Article XX of the GATT. Two sections would
be of most applicability, Article XX(b) and (g). Article XX(b) is a difficult
option, for although it allows for exemptions aimed at the protection of
“human, animal or plant life,” 46 it also carries with it a strict necessity
requirement.47 A more feasible line of argument would be through Article
XX (g) that affords for the protection of an “exhaustible natural resource.”48
Furthermore, Article XX (g) is functionally broader in two ways. First, the
phrase “[measures] relating to” has been granted a liberal interpretation,49
thus encompassing a wide array of environmental projects. Second,
the term “exhaustible natural resources” has been similarly interpreted,
encompassing biological resources such as fish stocks,50 or turtles,51 and
non-living resources, such as clean air.52 Measures relating to the protection
of the global climate should have little difficulty finding a home in Article
XX (g).
A measure which requires both domestic and international producers
to achieve a green benchmark or purchase an ETS allowance surely is a
measure aimed at preserving an exhaustible natural resource. However,
the analysis does not simply come to a standstill on that point alone. A
measure which essentially amounts to an import ban, with the caveat of
permissible admission into the common market barring either adherence
to the exact emission regime as domestic producers who receive free ETS
credits, or the purchasing of an ETS allowance like all other domestic
producers is quite burdensome and will draw tight scrutiny from a panel.
46 See GATT 1947, supra note 38 Article XX (b).
47 Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Complaint by
United States) (1990), GATT Doc. BISD 37S/200 (Panel Report), online: WTO <http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm>
48 Ibid; see GATT 1947, supra note 38 Article XX (g).
49 EC—Asbestos, supra note 43 at para. 174.
50 United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna from Canada (Complaint by
Canada) (1982), GATT Doc. BISD 29S/91 (Panel Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm>
51 United States—Importation Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(Complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand) (1998) WTO Doc. WT/DS58/
AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm> [US—Shrimp/Turtle I].
52 Supra note 45.
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A similar scenario arose in Shrimp/Turtle I where the US put in place an
import ban on all shrimp not harvested using a Turtle Excluder Device
(TED).53 Upon examination, the tribunal found the measure to be aimed at
the preservation of an exhaustible natural resource,54 done so in a precise
fashion,55 and neutral in its applications to domestic and international
products. Subsequently, the measure was found to be provisionally
justified. Likewise, if the EU measure was found to be aimed at the
preservation of an exhaustible natural resource – in this case the global
climate – and was considered both specific and impartial in its application,
it too would be provisionally justified barring the application of the
provisions under the chapeau.
3. Application of the Chapeau
After a measure is found to be provisionally justified under Article XX,
the panel then applies the three part requirement established by the
chapeau; namely is the measure a means of “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade[?]”56
Functionally the requirements of the chapeau are focused on the
implementation of the measure in question. As such, it reinforces the need
for both substantive and procedural fairness in application.57 In Shrimp/
Turtle I, the panel found that although the measure was indeed aimed at
the protection of an exhaustible natural resource (turtles), it also had an
ulterior motivation of attempting to require Members to adopt essentially
the same regulatory regime through coercion rather than discourse.58 It
was further noted by the panel that the certification process for importers
was unclear, and thus the overall measure was unjustifiable.59 In response,
the US did not remove its ban. Rather, it refined its certification process to
have clear and flexible guidelines, and entered into “good faith” multilateral
negotiations with concerned states over conservation measures. These steps
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Supra note 51.
Ibid. at para. 134.
Ibid. at para. 142.
GATT 1947, supra note 38 Article XX.
Supra note 36 at 48.
Supra note 51 at para. 165-166.
Ibid. at para. 186.
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were found to be sufficient to address the concerns raised by the tribunal,
and thus the measure was subsequently upheld under an Article 21.5
review.60 Furthermore, in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres the Appellate Body chose
to focus its analysis of the chapeau on “the cause of the discrimination,
and the rationale put forward to explain its existence.”61 Moreover, they
found that if the measure was to be applied in an inconsistent fashion
– principally because of the MERCOSUR exception – and thus Brazil’s
measure was found to be in violation of the chapeau.
Applying these considerations to the EU measure for it to be found as
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau, three major elements
would need to be present. First, the EU must continue to use the
multilateral track in hopes of finding a mutually beneficial and, more
importantly, binding accord. However, as noted in Shrimp/Turtle 21.5 an
agreement need not be reached to satisfy the “good faith” requirement.
Rather the panel focused on “good faith” participation and financial
support for the process.62 For to have the bar requiring an agreement
would essentially offer a veto to any Member who did not want to comply.
This is an important point considering the difficulty states had in Bali
simply trying to find consensus on a road map for future negotiations.
Second, the EU measure must have environmental benchmarks for the
exception from the ETS program that are clear, readily available, justifiable,
realistic and flexible. Moreover, they must be as demanding or even less
so when compared to domestic producers or risk falling victim to the
same faults as in US—Reformulated Gas, and Shrimp/Turtle I. Finally, the
measure must be applied in a homogenous manner both domestically and
abroad.
60 United States—Importation Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—
Recourse to Article 21.5 (Complaint by Malaysia) (2001) WTO Doc. WT/DS58/RW at
para. 152. (Panel Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds58_e.htm> [Shrimp/Turtle 21.5]
61 Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Complaint by European
Communities) (2007) WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R at para. 226. (Appellate Body
Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds332_e.
htm>
62 Supra note 60 at para.132.
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On the whole, and barring any technicalities in its application, even a
hybrid measure which requires importers who have not achieved the
accepted emissions benchmarks to purchase ETS credits, while allowing
for a free allowance to domestic producers who have, seems justifiable
even under the chapeau. The goal of such a measure is not to restrict
trade, rather to encourage it in an environmentally sustainable fashion.
Governments have an unequivocal right to regulate the conditions
in which products are sold in their market.63 As long as the terms
for exemption from the ETS regime are equal for both domestic and
international producers (arguably slightly lesser for foreign producers
for increased flexibility), and is not simply intended to protect ailing EU
industries, then the measure should be looked upon favourably by a WTO
panel.

IV. PROVISIONAL REFORMS TO COMBAT
CLIMATE CHANGE

Countries vary greatly in their particular position on the issue of climate
change, and their willingness to pay for adaptation to mitigate it. Some
are progressive and forward-thinking in their approach, taking the globe
on their shoulders and leading the way. Others concern themselves with
stifling the process at every opportunity, seemingly content to see the world
deteriorate under their watch. By virtue of the problem being global in
character, it demands a global response. However, because of the difficulty
of achieving a binding international agreement on the topic, many fear
states will be forced to resort to unilateral measures to persuade derogatory
nations to comply. This section will put forward two general areas which
could be reformed to empower nations with a wider array of tools to
mitigate the costs of climate change. First, it will address the issue of
environmental subsidies, and second, it will consider the issue of unilateral
63 Supra note 37 at 306.
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action. In the end, the world trade system is meant to maximize the welfare
of states, not act as an oppressive yoke to addressing concerns of immense
importance.

A. Environmental Subsidies
Subsidies that are aimed at a valid environmental objective should, without
question, be permissible under WTO law. It seems terribly illogical
that if a nation wants to impose tight environmental restrictions on its
industries, in turn demanding them to bear the cost of an increased
domestic regulatory regime, that these industries should also have to face
the world market as under-competitive – albeit progressive – but undercompetitive nevertheless. Indeed, some measures are arguably justifiable
(as demonstrated above) but it would be much more efficacious to simply
address environmentally grounded subsidies in a comprehensive manner.
There seem to be three major areas where reform could occur. First, the
rules pertaining to subsidies could be refined to differentiate between
positive and negative subsidies.64 If a more narrowed definition of subsidy
was put forward, with a particular emphasis on injury to the foreign
party, or one that allowed for an exception when measures were aimed at
readjusting competitive discrepancies due to environmental practices,65
it may alleviate much of the problems. Second, a clear exception could
also be worked in for subsidies aimed at implementing environmental
measures. Admittedly, this is a similar notion to the old Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code, and could fall victim to the difficulty of differentiating
between a useful and a harmful subsidy.66 However, that worry could be
eased with the articulation of some criteria for what constitutes a beneficial
versus a harmful subsidy. Lastly, there could be an explicit clause hindering
a state from subsidizing high GHG emitting industries – for instance
coal. If integrated in unison, states would find themselves with a wider
64 Supra note 34 at 405.
65 Ibid.
66 Supra note 34 at 407.
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selection of tools to combat environmental threat, while preserving the
competitiveness of domestic industries.

B. Unilateral Action
Although a multilaterally negotiated accord is the preferable avenue to
combating climate change, historically it has proven extremely difficult
to either come to an agreement, or if an agreement is signed, major
emitters are notably absent. How then does anyone proactively address
global environmental threats, if by their very nature the threat is global in
character? Some scholars suggest in certain circumstances the use of trade
measures as a weapon to encourage exporting states to adopt some level
of environmental control.67 Others propose a more coercive approach,
where large green states makes foreign aid packages contingent upon
accepting more stringent environmental measures.68 Both approaches have
their merit. However, the latter option only works when there is a power
imbalance favouring the green state – generally this situation arises in
relation to developing countries.
What then to do about large, powerful and generally environmentally
deviant nations, who no matter how clear the threat is, still resist action?
It is one of the principle shortcomings of such multilateral treaties as the
Kyoto Protocol, for although it is comprehensive in nature there are many
notable countries absent. More troublesome, there is no mechanism to
persuade them to join.69 Robust trade measures could be used as a tool to
persuade dissenters to come to the negotiation table with a more realistic
agenda, or be prepared to conclude a more wholesome agreement. It must
67 The World Bank, International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal and
Institutional Perspectives (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008) at 36.
68 Richard H. Steinberg, “Power and Cooperation in International Environmental Law”
in Andrew Guzman & Alan Sykes, eds., Research Handbook in International Economic
Law, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007) at 528
69 Jeffrey Frankel, “Kyoto and Geneva: Linkage of the Climate Change Regime and the
Trade Regime” (2004) [unpublished archived at Kennedy School of Government Faculty
Working Paper no. PWP04-042] online: Harvard <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/
wpaper.nsf/ rwp/RWP04-042/$File/rwp_04_042_frankel.pd>
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be stressed that this strategy is not put forward to condone a global trade
war. To the contrary, in our time of economic interdependence nations are
in need of global trade more than ever in human history. However, if nations
are prepared to sacrifice the health of not only their citizens, but the earth’s
climate as a whole, to simply take a quicker path on the road to development,
the global community should be able to restrict the flow of their goods.
More prudently, the WTO should allow this. A plausible option could be in
the form of an approval for differential treatment among Members in terms
of MFN or national treatment based on objective criteria as was suggested
in EC—Trade Preferences.70 Understandably, differential treatment in this
case was in relation to developing countries. However, the logic still holds
when applied to the globally developed. If a nation uses valid objective
criteria and is uniform in its application, granting preferential access to
nations that are greener, while still providing a means for developing
nations to achieve these benchmarks (foreign aid, or CDMs), an approach
like this should be favoured not frowned upon. A second option that
should be approached with caution is an acceptance that nations may
unilaterally impose tight domestic regulations, and force importers
to adhere to a similar standard or risk losing access to that particular
market. Although under current GATT Article XX jurisprudence such
a measure has an arguable level of success, the constraints placed by the
chapeau are at times worrisome from an environmental perspective.
It is understandable why they are in place, to protect Members from
unjustifiable discrimination. However, holistically, these requirements also
hinder the creativity of Members to react to the threat of climate change,
because they must constantly be wary of the measure employed having
a discriminatory effect. In the absence of a uniform global approach to
taxation of energy and GHG emissions,71 minor deference being paid by
the panel to Members who are addressing a global threat such as climate
change – even if they are unilateral in nature – would be sufficient.
70 European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries (Complaint by India) (2004) WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R at para. 20
(Appellant Body Report) online: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds246_e.htm>
71 Supra note 67 at 40.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Human activity has been proven unequivocally to be a root cause of the
recent shift in the global climate, and there is no longer any disputing
this. The IPCC are in agreement that action must be taken immediately
to address the underlying fundamental contributors to climate change,
namely GHG emissions, or risk an irreversible alteration to the global
ecosystem.72 In response, the EU has forged forward. Their recently signed
climate initiative, the 20/20 by 2020 is a comprehensive domestic response,
and sets a high standard for other progressive nations to follow. However,
in the absence of a wide-ranging multilateral reaction to climate change
that binds on signatories a cap on GHG emissions, European industries
and consumers will be paying the price for progress while others capitalize.
This reality has urged calls from some for the imposition of a carbon tax of
sorts to equalize the international playing field for European products and
to encourage responsible states to accept responsibility.
However, many worry that such a rash action may not only have a
chilling effect on international relations, but will also be found to be
discriminatory under the WTO covered agreements. The EU has stressed
that its intention is not to breach WTO law and, as illustrated, each of the
measures suggested by the EU has a strong chance of being found to be
acceptable using the reasoning of EC—Asbestos, and Shrimp/Turtle 21.5.
Furthermore, even a more robust hybrid measure has a viable chance
of success under the same reasoning. Nevertheless, states should be
empowered with the requisite tools to combat such a threat. Environmental
subsidies should be incorporated into WTO law, to allow states to offset
the negative competitive effects of progressive green initiative. Further,
states should be given the support necessary to act unilaterally if necessary.
In a global system dominated by interest politics, many times it may be
difficult to conclude an agreement on climate change which is potent or
binding. Absent such an agreement, nations who choose to adhere to a
72 Supra note 2 at 72.
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more rigorous environmental regime should not have to pay for it twice;
once in terms of the costs of adaptation and again in terms of a loss of
competitiveness. The WTO must be aware of this concern and adapt to
accommodate it. Although it is not a politically prudent option, large
GHG emitting states may never truly consider a realistic reduction unless
they feel there is a threat (be it either by having markets closed off to their
goods, or by being forced to incur a great cost to comply with import
standards). Regardless of how, progressive nations must be empowered to
persuade others to collectively combat climate change, and at very least
they should not be penalized for protecting the planet.

